Facts
The case dealt with appeals in which both accused persons had been held guilty by the respective trial courts for the offense of aggravated sexual assault under 10 POCSO, along with other IPC corollary sections. In the case of Satish, the child survivor aged 12 years was sexually assaulted by the accused wherein the touch was without removing her clothes. In the case of Libnus, the child survivor aged 5 years was sexually assaulted by the accused wherein the accused tried to remove her clothes and showed her his penis. In both cases, appeals were filed to the Bombay High Court and the High Court acquitted the accused persons under S.10 POCSO and only held the accused guilty under the corollary IPC Sections.
Judgment
An argument was raised before the court that Sections 29 and 30 must be given strict interpretation as the presumptions and the reverse burden of proof on the accused make it difficult for the accused to prove his innocence. Therefore, any interpretation other than the strict interpretation would expand the scope of the offense and would not further the constitutional objective of Article 21. The Supreme Court, on a joint reading of Sections 7, 11, 29, and 30, held that “sexual intent,” as per the Explanation to Section 11, would be a question of fact. When the Special Court believes the existence of a fact beyond reasonable doubt, the court can raise a presumption under Section 30 as regards the existence of “culpable mental state” on the part of the accused, and the same is clear from the explanation to Section 30. It is then up to the accused to rebut such a presumption regarding a culpable state of mind. The court further held that, considering the objects of the POCSO Act, its provisions, particularly those pertaining to sexual assault, sexual harassment, etc., have to be construed vis-√†-vis the other provisions, so as to make the objects of the Act more meaningful and effective and there was no need to raise the rule of lenity as that can only be raised when the statute is ambiguous, which it isn‚Äôt in the present case. The court also held that skin to skin contact is not a necessity for conviction under Section 8 and 10 POCSO.